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In the context of costs, one issue that has become increasingly prevalent is the taxation of e-discovery costs to the losing litigant, a procedure that essentially awards to the prevailing party e-discovery costs it incurred.
2 Given the monetarily significant and growing cost of e-discovery services, it has been argued that awarding costs to the prevailing party could be one way to reign in unnecessary discovery requests. 3 One commentator has argued that the ability to impose ediscovery costs can be used as a tool by courts in situations where there is a disagreement over the scope of an e-discovery request. 4 Holy Trinity addressed the enforcement of the Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885 against a church that imported an English clergyman to serve as its rector.
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According to the statute in question, "it shall be unlawful . . . to . . . assist or encourage the importation or migration, of any alien or aliens . . . into the United States . . . under contract or agreement . . . to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States . . . ." 12 In Holy Trinity, the Court explained that despite the statutory text, the act was intended to address workforce issues regarding the importation of manual laborers, not professionals, relying on the fact that the common understanding of the terms "labor" or "laborer" did not encompass the duties of preaching or preachers. 13 The Court then stated: "another guide to the meaning of a statute is found in the evil which it is designed to remedy; and for this the court properly looks at contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body." 14 This statement indicates that Congress' goal in enacting a particular statute is relevant in determining how that statute should be interpreted.
Subsequently, the Court focused on and discussed Congress' purpose for the statute in question. The Court referenced a district court case that described as "common knowledge"
15 Congress' goal of remedying the negative effect on the labor market of a situation in which large capitalists exploited foreign laborers in a system reminiscent of indentured servitude, where employers would pay the immigrants' travel fare in exchange for some period of work at a very low wage. 16 The explanation also noted that nothing in the congressional committee reports or other parts of the legislative history indicated that the United States had "a surplus of brain toilers." 17 Congressional intent was further explicated when the Court referenced a house committee report and a senate committee on education and labor report in support of the proposition that the statute was intended only to 10 Id. 11 Id. at 1835. 12 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458 (1892). 13 Id. at 463. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Id. at 463-64. 17 Id. at 464. 18 Ultimately, the Court held that although the church's conduct in importing the clergyman was explicitly covered by the statute, Congress did not intend it to apply to professional workers such as clergymen. 19 Although the holding was unequivocal, at least one commentator has argued that the Court misread the legislative history in Holy Trinity in that the relevant legislative history actually supported the plain language of the statute and thus, a ruling against the church.
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In contrast to the aforementioned use of legislative history, several highly influential textualist members of the judiciary argue against the use of legislative history as an authoritative indication of congressional intent when construing the meaning of a statute. 21 The textualist argument is based on two major premises: (1) the 535-member Congress does not have a "'genuine' collective intent with respect to matters left ambiguous by the statute itself;" 22 and (2) legislative history has not been voted upon by Congress or signed by the President and thus, it should not be given "decisive weight" or "dispositive effect." 23 It has also been argued that textualism serves as a way to protect separation of powers and prevent "legislative self-delegation" 24 by preventing ambiguous statutes from being interpreted by government officials who do not have the constitutional authority to perform this function (i.e. judges are not constitutionally empowered to legislate). 25 Despite this vocal opposition, legislative history is widely used by courts, including the Supreme Court, in statutory interpretation. 
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54
According to Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs-other than attorney's fees-should be allowed to the prevailing party."
27 Based on the text of this rule, when a party prevails in a case, it can recover costs from the losing party in addition to any award of damages that it receives. 28 In addition, Rule 54(d)(1) authorizes the clerk of court to allow costs to the prevailing party on fourteen days' notice, but allows the court to review the clerk's action if a motion is served within the next seven days following the clerk's taxing of costs.
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The Supreme Court has explicitly held in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc. that within the seemingly broad discretion for courts to award costs offered by Rule 54(d)(1), a district court is limited to taxation of costs authorized by a federal statute. 30 The Court refused to infer that Rule 54(d) or another more general statute resulted in the repeal of a more specific statute, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1920. 31 In other words, a general statute will not supersede a specific statute without "clear intention otherwise."
32 Thus, when a court awards costs pursuant to Rule 54(d), it cannot authorize costs beyond what Congress has specified in another statute. That said, district courts typically have significant discretion in deciding whether to award costs to the prevailing party in litigation within the context of such a statute and there is a strong presumption that the district court will do so with the appellate court conducting a review for abuse of discretion.
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Despite the outwardly broad discretion available under Rule 54(d)(1), courts consistently acknowledge that they may only award costs within the scope of the 27 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1). 28 38 
Id. See also

Id.
39 The text of Rule 54(d) in the April 1937 advisory committee report in which this note first appeared is not materially different from the current text of Rule 54(d)(1) and seems to embody the same basic purpose as the current rule. In the April 1937 advisory committee report, the text read as follows:
(d) Costs. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; but costs against the United States, its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. fascinating to note that the Payne article cited by the advisory committee expressed hope that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were in the process of being written at the time that article was published, would address the issue of costs and revise the statutes related to cost awards to prevailing parties. 40 The Payne article went on to note that prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, costs were taxed to the losing party unless prohibited by statute or an established principle of law such as the principle that costs are denied to the prevailing party when a court lacks jurisdiction. 41 The Payne article concluded that the law regarding costs is "disconnected and fragmentary." 42 In addition, Payne stated that cases (often involving insubstantial amounts of money) were decided haphazardly and "[t]here seems to be no underlying principles of law involved other than that the prevailing party should be reimbursed for a portion of the expense of the litigation."
Report of Advisory
43 Thus, despite the relative confusion in the common law and the fact that e-discovery represents a significant litigation expense, the pre-Rule 54 common law supports the notion that e-discovery costs are taxable to the losing litigant.
While e-discovery represents a technological evolution that has changed the nature of litigation costs (often resulting in far more significant volumes of discoverable material and thus substantially larger costs), 44 Rule 54 introduced a broader, all-encompassing definition of cost taxation. The broad definition of costs would establish a principle of law that Payne found to be lacking in this area. The advisory committee did not explain what aspects of Payne's article were intended to guide Rule 54(d); however, in order to make the law less disconnected and fragmentary, it is essential that all costs that are necessary to litigation, and within the scope of statutory authority, be evaluated and taxed appropriately. It is highly unlikely that the advisory committee sought to perpetuate the lack of clarity that existed in the common law by adopting Rule 54(d). brought an action to recover $21,014.43 that was allegedly due to the plaintiff for coal that was delivered to the defendant. 45 The defendant denied that the plaintiff presented a complete record of the transactions between the parties and counterclaimed for failure to perform on coal contracts totaling $9,999.10. 46 The judge appointed an auditor and stenographer upon motion of the defendant, despite opposition by the plaintiff, to investigate the facts and simplify issues for the jury with costs to be paid by one or both parties as determined by the trial judge. 47 In deciding this dispute, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the trial court had discretion to tax the costs of the auditor and stenographer. 48 The Court stated that:
Federal trial courts have, sometimes by general rule, sometimes by decision upon the facts of a particular case, included in the taxable costs expenditures incident to the litigation which were ordered by the court because deemed essential to a proper consideration of the case by the court or the jury.
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In further explaining the then current law on the issue, the Court noted several circuits held that printing expenses for records and briefs were taxable to the losing litigant. 50 The Court held that because there was no federal or state statute and no court rule on these specific costs, auditors' and stenographers' fees could be taxable items "like other expenditures ordered by the court with a view to securing an intelligent consideration of a case." 51 Ultimately, the Court explained, the trial court's order was erroneous in stating that one or both parties should bear the costs, given the long-held rule that "in actions at law the prevailing party is entitled to costs as of right, except in those few cases where by express statutory provision or by established principles costs are denied." 52 Likewise, the prevailing party was 45 In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 304 (1920). 46 Id. 47 Id.
48 Id. at 315. 49 Id.
50 Id. at 315-16. 51 Id. at 317. 52 Id. at 318-19 (internal citations omitted). entitled to "the entire costs in the trial court" 53 and the court could not apportion costs based on failure of part of the prevailing party's claims or other fairness considerations.
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The Supreme Court's statements in In re Peterson, cited in the advisory committee note in 1937, support an interpretation of Rule 54(d)(1) that grants cost awards to prevailing parties as long as those costs are not barred by a federal statute. 55 In the context of this Note, those statements support e-discovery cost awards under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Even prior to the codification of Rule 54, there was strong support in the common law that prevailing parties were entitled to litigation costs including the use of outside experts such as an auditor and stenographer. 56 While In re Peterson does not, of course, address e-discovery in particular, the opinion emphasized that costs could be taxed when deemed by a court as essential to the litigation. 57 A similar distinction between essential and non-essential costs has been applied in cases addressing e-discovery costs under Rule 54(d)(1) and § 1920 (4) such that e-discovery costs were awarded to the prevailing party where they were deemed necessary, but declined where they were for the convenience of counsel.
58 E-discovery services represent a technological extrapolation of necessary expert services, 59 such as auditors or stenographers, because modern litigation often cannot be resolved effectively without those services. Today, relevant information is often stored in electronic databases, especially in litigation involving large business or government entities. Therefore, an examination of the advisory committee note to Rule 54(d) reveals that the cited 53 Id. at 318. 54 
Id.
55 See supra note 37. 56 In re Peterson, 253 U.S. at 315-16. 57 Id. at 315. 
D. § 1920
The text of the relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1920, that has been relied on for taxation of e-discovery costs states that "[a] judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following: . . . (4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case." 60 The current statute reflects a 2008 congressional amendment, which modified paragraph (4) of § 1920. Congress removed the term "copies of papers" and changed it to "the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are." 61 The removal of the word "papers" holds significance in the context of e-discovery. A significant number of federal district courts and federal appellate courts have interpreted this statute to allow for recovery of e-discovery costs by the prevailing party.
With regard to the types of costs to which § 1920 can be applied, Title 28 of the United States Code was enacted partially in response to the status of federal statutes governing the judiciary which, according to the 1948 senate judiciary committee report, encompassed a set of statutes that was "archaic, ambiguous, conflicting, and to an unascertained extent repealed by implication by later statutes." 68 In addition, the committee noted the majority of statutes was made obsolete by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that Title 28 constituted uncontroversial and substantial improvements that modernized the law as applied to the federal judiciary. 69 The senate judiciary committee's statements are congruent with the concept of adapting the judiciary to respond to evolving circumstances of litigation such as the expansion of e-discovery.
The house judiciary committee reiterated the senate committee's goals in stating that "the bill would modernize and bring up to date the laws relating to the judiciary and to judicial procedure" in a manner similar to what the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure accomplished. 70 The house also noted the tremendous societal changes that had occurred since the previous statutory revision to the Judicial Code in 1911 and that the federal judiciary had admirably withstood those changes.
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More specifically, the house judiciary committee report noted that § 1920 was written to be consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). 72 The committee noted that instead of stating that the judge or clerk of the court "shall" tax costs, the language was substituted such that the judge or clerk of court "may" tax costs because Rule 54(d) makes taxation of costs discretionary rather than mandatory. 73 The house judiciary committee report reflects the need to harmonize, modernize, and streamline federal judiciary procedure in a manner that accords with changes to the judicial landscape. Furthermore, while both the senate and house reports far pre-date the arrival of e-discovery, it is apparent that with regard to judicial procedure, Congress has consistently focused on keeping the law in line with evolution in judicial practice. This focus is reflected in Congress' 2008 attempt to modernize the federal judiciary through the Judicial Administration and Technical Amendments Act, which amended § 1920(4).
Legislative History of the 2008 Amendment to § 1920(4)
The current state of § 1920(4) in which the phrase "copies of papers" was substituted with "the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are [necessarily obtained for use in the case]" was intended by Congress to specifically account for costs associated with e-discovery. 74 Perhaps most clearly, the section of the Public Law where this statutory amendment was made is titled "Assessment of Court Technology Costs." 75 According to the congressional record of the senate, the Judicial Administration and Technical Amendments Act of 2008 was "intended to improve the administration and efficiency of our federal court system by replacing antiquated processes and bureaucratic hurdles with the necessary tools for the 21st century." Representative Lofgren also specifically referenced the amendment to § 1920 (4) record influenced the conclusion that copying costs were a necessary part of the litigation; and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in taxing these costs. 84 Nonetheless, the court's decision relied significantly on its interpretation of the text of § 1920(4). This decision can be thought of as an attempt to justify ediscovery taxation based on the statute that was in place prior to the 2008 amendment because the court recognized evolving technological needs in the discovery process.
U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E
Citing the BDT Products decision, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa held in its 2007 decision, Brown v. McGraw-Hill
Companies, Inc., that "electronic scanning of documents is the modern-day equivalent of 'exemplification and copies of paper,' and, therefore, can be taxed pursuant to § 1920(4)." 85 In this case, it is significant to note that McGraw-Hill sought only $205.12 from the plaintiff for costs related to both black and white and color paper scanning. 86 Thus, despite the unambiguous statement by the court regarding the electronic scanning of documents, it would be difficult to extrapolate this logic to a case involving e-discovery costs in the hundreds of thousands, even millions of dollars. Likewise, prior to the 2008 amendment to § 1920(4), the idea that scanning was the equivalent of copying was likely far more judicially palatable than asserting that extensive and expensive forensic e-discovery work falls within the ambit of copying.
Recognition of Technological Changes: Post-2008 Amendment Decisions
Consistent with the aforementioned pre-amendment decisions regarding scanning of documents, Cargill v. Progressive Dairy Solutions addressed the taxation of FedEx/Kinkos charges for electronic document scanning as part of production in discovery. 87 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California explained that these costs were recoverable because the volume of documents required that the production be electronic; and thus, "scanning of documents was necessary to provide an adequate defense to the several motions 84 BDT Products, 405 F.3d at 420. 88 Interestingly, even though this decision was rendered after the 2008 amendment to § 1920(4), the court based its decision on "authority that electronic data and scanned data are considered 'exemplification'" rather than invoking the recent statutory amendment that explicitly removed the "paper" limitation from the copying language of § 1920(4).
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In CBT Flint Partners v. Return Path, the plaintiff argued that $243,453.02 in fees incurred by the defendant's e-discovery vendor for services rendered in response to plaintiff's discovery request was not taxable under § 1920. 90 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia noted a difference of opinion in courts as to whether e-discovery costs were recoverable under § 1920 because some courts viewed them as the modern equivalent of exemplification and copies, whereas other courts held that assembling such records for production in discovery is normally performed by lawyers or paralegals and is thus not taxable to the losing litigant. 91 Who should perform the service is relevant because § 1920 does not allow for taxation of costs for attorney or paralegal work and such costs would be more appropriately considered in an award of attorney's fees. 92 While recognizing that there have been differences of opinion regarding the scope of § 1920, the court acknowledged that the services 93 provided here were "highly technical" and that attorneys and paralegals are neither trained to provide such ediscovery services nor capable of performing them. 94 Likewise, the CBT Flint court asserted that e-discovery costs are necessary in the "electronic age" and that perhaps the taxation of these burdensome costs might 88 Id. 89 Id. The Cargill court also references BDT Products v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. for the proposition that "electronic scanning and imaging could be interpreted as 'exemplification and copies of papers.'" Id. (citing BDT Products. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2005)). Given that Cargill was decided so soon after § 1920(4) was amended, the BDT Products decision was perhaps the most relevant precedent because the change in statutory language only reinforced that decision. The services provided by the e-discovery vendor in this case included the production of electronic documents from both network files and hard drives. CBT Flint, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 1380. 94 Id. at 1381. discourage litigants from insisting that the opposing party produce huge quantities of costly e-discovery materials. 95 A final notable point that the court considered was that the cost would have been higher to produce the 1.4 million documents and six versions of source code at issue in paper than the cost to pay for e-discovery services. 96 Presumably, the court addressed this point because if the defendant had indeed produced these documents in paper form, there would have been no question that the cost of making those copies would have been taxable under § 1920(4). Therefore, it would have been nonsensical to preclude recovery of a less expensive discovery method, especially in light of the fact that § 1920(4) was amended in 2008 with the recognition that recovery for copying papers was no longer sufficient to satisfy the needs of modern litigation.
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Not all district courts have allowed for taxation of e-discovery costs to the losing litigant. In Fells v. Virginia Department of Transportation, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rejected the defendant's recovery of e-discovery costs under § 1920 (4) . 98 The court declined to extend the statutory notion of "copying" to what the court described as "a burgeoning array of electronic discovery techniques." 99 The court stated that § 1920(4) allows for recovery of expenses for copying of materials that are reasonably necessary for litigation, but not for copies made for counsel's convenience. 100 The court referred to testimony that the e-discovery techniques used in the case fashioned documents for efficient use in litigation (i.e. convenience), which essentially resulted in the defendant seeking recovery for the creation of searchable electronic documents.
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In holding that the defendant did not meet its burden to demonstrate that § 1920 should support the recovery of these costs, the court stated:
Regardless of whether scanning documents should be viewed as copying materials, the court does not find that this category of taxable costs includes defendant's techniques of processing records, extracting data, and converting 95 Id. This distinction between creating searchable documents and reproducing paper documents in electronic form is dubious at best: the mere conversion of documents into electronic form often results in creating a searchable document as the vast majority of common electronic document formats have some function that enables searching. The court concluded its discussion of § 1920 taxation by stating that because the statute does not support recovery for electronic data processing, the court would not determine whether the costs associated with e-discovery of these documents were necessary at the time they were incurred. 103 Rather than draw the somewhat tenuous distinction between searchable documents and paper reproductions, the court likely could have made a statutorily consistent argument that the creation of searchable documents was not necessary, but rather merely for the convenience of counsel.
In a frequently cited decision on this issue, Kellogg Brown & Root International, Inc. v. Altanmia Commercial Marketing Co., the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the data extraction and storage services performed by an e-discovery vendor in question were not recoverable by the prevailing party under § 1920(4) because they were not "electronic equivalents of exemplification and copying." 104 The court then stated that "extracting data from an electronic medium and storing that data for possible use in discovery is more like the work of an attorney or legal assistant in locating and segregating documents that may be responsive to discovery than it is like copying those documents for use in a case." 105 However, although the perception may be that such preparation of documents is more like the work of an attorney than it is like copying, the court did not explain how a lawyer or legal assistant would have the necessary skills to perform this work. As articulated in CBT Flint, technical services are a necessary part of modern litigation and neither lawyers nor their legal staffs have the requisite skills to perform this work without employing 102 Id. (emphasis in original). an expert. 106 The court discussed another case that held that e-discovery costs were not recoverable under § 1920(4) because the type of electronic document retrieval performed in that case would have been performed by attorneys and paralegals in a non-electronic document case and thus, would not have been taxable under § 1920 (4) . 107 This argument is not persuasive because it denies the reality that e-discovery is a complex and specialized part of modern litigation. Simply because legal professionals may have performed a type of work in the paper context does not mean that legal professionals can or should do it in the electronic context. Furthermore, the court cited the Fells case for its distinction between scanning/copying paper documents into an electronic format and data processing to create searchable electronic documents. 108 However, as discussed earlier, evolving technology with regard to document formatting undercuts this argument.
In Tibble v. Edison International, the United States District Court for the Central District of California highlighted the distinction between e-discovery costs for convenience of counsel and those that are necessary for the litigation. 109 The plaintiffs objected to being taxed for the defendants' costs related to employing computer experts who extracted large amounts of computer data and asserted that those costs fell outside the scope of Rule 54 and § 1920. 110 The e-discovery costs in question were approximately $530,000.00, which made them the most significant of the defendants' costs. 111 The court relied on a Ninth Circuit decision for the proposition that the court has significant discretion to interpret the § 1920 categories when taxing costs to the losing litigant. 112 In addition, the court noted a Within that context, the court explained that defendants' costs were necessary rather than for the convenience of counsel based on the plaintiffs' requests for electronically stored information ("ESI") with which the defendants were required to comply, including requests for documents that were over ten years old and requests that ultimately encompassed 537,955 pages. 114 The court again invoked both the magnitude and wide scope of ESI requests, a common sense justification for taxing significant costs on the losing litigant. The court also specified that the costs in this case were not excessive because the third-party computer technicians were selected based on a competitive bidding process and were charging market rates. 115 Rather than explore the intricacies of § 1920 and Rule 54, the court accepted the concept that electronic discovery costs are taxable under § 1920(4).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently discussed the recoverability of e-discovery costs under § 1920(4), specifically referencing the 2008 amendment's legislative history. 116 In In re Ricoh Co., Ltd. Patent Litigation, the plaintiff argued that the district court should not have awarded $234,702.43 of costs to the prevailing defendant under § 1920(4) for the use of Stratify, a thirdparty e-discovery vendor engaged in electronic database creation and other document processing and review functions, because the Stratify costs involved creation of an electronic document review database that was not necessary to the litigation. 117 The court explained that under § 1920(4), exemplification and copying costs associated with document discovery are recoverable and then referenced Northern District of California Local Civil Rule 54-3(d)(2) for the proposition that reproduction of discovery documents is a taxable cost. 118 The court then concluded that the costs for the database created by Stratify were taxable because the database served as a means through which document production was accomplished in this case. 114 Id. 115 Id. at *8. 116 In re Ricoh Co., Ltd. Patent Litig., 661 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 117 Id. at 1364-65. 118 Id. at 1365. 119 Id. The Ricoh court then pronounced that document production should not be "so narrowly construed as to cover only printing and Bates-labeling a document." 120 Also, given the technological changes regarding e-discovery that have occurred, electronic document production has been recognized by courts as within the "exemplification" and "making copies" provisions of § 1920 (4) . 121 Most significantly, the court specifically referenced the 2008 amendment to § 1920 (4) and the legislative history of that amendment that supports the taxation of ediscovery costs. 122 While unambiguously recognizing that the production of electronic documents is recoverable under § 1920(4), the court concluded that in this particular situation, the plaintiff and defendant agreed to share the Stratify costs and that agreement supersedes and precludes taxation. 123 
G. Requests to the Clerk of Court for Taxation of E-Discovery Costs
One recent district court case involved a prevailing litigant that sought taxation of e-discovery costs directly from the clerk of court. 124 While the language of § 1920 clearly supports the clerk of court's ability to review the record and tax ediscovery costs, one wonders whether Congress intended that the clerk of court should have the authority to tax the staggering costs associated with e-discovery. 125 In Race Tires America v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., the clerk of court determined that the two defendants' taxable e-discovery costs were $125,580.55 and $241,788.81 respectively based on the court's consideration of the parties' Bills of Costs and other relevant aspects of the record. 126 The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania upheld the clerk of court's award of e-discovery costs to the defendants under § 1920(4), reasoning that there was no information to suggest that electronic scanning was for the convenience of the parties or counsel rather than a necessity. 127 In reviewing the historical context of taxing e-discovery costs, the court took special note of the 2008 amendment to § 1920(4), stating that prior to this amendment that changed "copies of papers" to "copies of any materials," courts struggled with the issue of whether § 1920(4) allowed for recovery. 128 However, subsequent to this amendment, the court stated that "no court has categorically excluded e-discovery costs from allowable costs."
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In addition, the court attached substantial significance to the magnitude of the e-discovery requests by the plaintiff, twice noting that the plaintiff requested a "massive quantity" of ESI. 130 The court also noted that the parties agreed to produce documents electronically and that the plaintiff "aggressively pursued ediscovery under the Case Management Plan." 131 The court specifically noted that the plaintiff made 273 discovery requests to one defendant and 119 requests to the other, which resulted in the copying of 490 gigabytes of data and 270,000 files.
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The specific citation of these numeric data values reflects the importance of quantity in the analysis. The court noted that the e-discovery vendor services provided to the defendants were "highly technical" and thus, attorneys or paralegals would not have had the requisite skills or training to perform those services. 133 The decision addressed the distinction that courts have made between costs for scanning, imaging, and conversion of non-electronic materials (the type of costs allowed in BDT Products) and costs that are made "to improve the format and design of electronic evidence." 134 In contrast to the latter costs, which "tend to serve a party's aesthetic preferences rather than exemplification of evidence," 135 the 127 Id. at *9. 128 Id. at *6 n.6. 129 Id.
130 Id. at *9. 131 Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit partially overturned and partially affirmed the decision in Race Tires America, Inc. in an opinion that narrowed the scope of § 1920(4) while recognizing that certain costs associated with e-discovery are statutorily recoverable. 137 The panel "agree[d] that scanning and conversion of native files to the agreed-upon format for production of ESI constitute 'making copies of materials.'" 138 Therefore, the court affirmed the taxation of $20,083.51 for "scanning of documents to create digital duplicates" and TIFF conversion, which was the agreed-upon format for the conversion native files for production of ESI. 139 The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's taxation of $10,286.91 for transferring VHS recordings to DVD format because it qualifies as "making copies" under § 1920(4), although the court noted that such copying did not necessarily require the "technical expertise of electronic discovery vendors."
140
Despite approving of the aforementioned costs, the court disallowed taxation of costs for the rest of the charges from the e-discovery vendor. 141 The following categories of e-discovery costs were disallowed by the court: preservation, collection, and processing of ESI, keyword searching, culling privileged material, and optical character recognition conversion. 142 The court stated that the district court did not explain why it considered the vendor's services to be encompassed within "making copies," but instead concluded that necessity of those services to "the ultimate production of electronic 'copies,' the services were equivalent to one entire act of 'making copies.'" 143 136 
Id.
137 Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 171-72 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 11-1520, 2012 WL 2340866 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2012). 138 Id. at 167. 139 Id. 140 Id. at 167-68. 141 Id. at 171. 142 Id. at 161-62. 143 Id. at 168. The Race Tires America court's reasoning was critical of other courts that allowed taxation of significant e-discovery vendor charges, stating that "[t]he decisions that allow taxation of all, or essentially all, electronic discovery consultant charges, such as the district court's ruling in this case, are untethered from the statutory mooring." 144 The court noted that § 1920(4) does not authorize taxation of costs simply because they require technical expertise nor does it authorize taxation of costs for all of the steps that ultimately lead to production of copies. 145 In the pre-e-discovery era, the court noted that only the act of making copies would have been considered taxable because the statute only permits for taxation of the costs of making copies, but not "taxation of charges necessarily incurred to discharge discovery obligations."
146 Ultimately, the court concluded that it lacks authority pursuant to § 1920(4) to award full e-discovery costs to the prevailing party despite policy reasons or equitable circumstances in favor of such taxation. 147 Further, the panel distinguished the decision In re Ricoh Patent Litigation because that case involved the creation of a document review database as agreed upon by the parties, which the Third Circuit acknowledged as taxable "as the functional equivalent of making copies" as opposed to "all the other activity, such as searching, culling, and deduplication, that are not taxable." 148 The Race Tires America decision reflects an acknowledgement that certain e-discovery costs are taxable under § 1920(4), while placing an unequivocal limitation on the scope of such taxation.
H. Conclusion
Legislative history has long been an effective tool in statutory interpretation. In reviewing relevant legislative history materials, this Note has found that the 1937 advisory committee notes to Rule 54 and the legislative histories of § 1920 and the 2008 amendment to § 1920(4) support a broad-based application of taxation of e-discovery costs. The courts that have spoken on taxation of ediscovery costs have generally justified fitting the costs into § 1920(4) by focusing on the necessity of such costs and the sheer volume of the e-discovery records 144 Id. at 169. 145 Id. 146 Id. 147 Id. at 171. 148 Id. at 171 n.11. (perhaps implying that any other form of production would be impossible or at the very least, imprudent).
It is significant to note that, while some of the courts' analysis on this issue is fact specific in that they are examining the actual type of e-discovery services provided in the context of statutory text, there seems to be a certain level of arbitrariness in the way courts evaluate whether or not costs are taxable under § 1920. 149 For example, there is no clear definition of what makes e-discovery services necessary versus convenient in a particular case; nor is there any specific quantity of discoverable materials that makes paper production impracticable. As the relevant technology is further refined, it will become easier to define the necessary scope of e-discovery services and these definitions will undoubtedly become sharper. Likewise, courts will refine their decisions with more concrete standards and statutory arguments as the understanding of § 1920(4) becomes more robust. Perhaps there will even be a future statutory amendment to clarify any ambiguity that may exist with regard to e-discovery costs.
